Visions (Questions and Practices) of History in T.S. Eliot

"That there can be no art greater than the art which has already been created: there will only be different and necessary different combinations of the eternal and the changing in the forms of art. That men individually can never attain anything higher than has already been attained among the Saints; but that in any place, in any time, another Saint may be born. Such a just perception of the permanent relations of the Enduring and the Changing should on the one hand make us realise our own time in better proportion to times past and times to come: we are now inclined to think of our own age and moment as hysterically as people did in the year 1000. And on the other hand it should help us to think better of our own time, as not isolated or unique, and remind us that fundamentally our individual problems and duties are the same as they have been for others at any time—and equally our opportunities."—A Commentary, *Criterion* 12/46 (October 1932)

"Tradition by itself is not enough; it must be perpetually criticised and brought up to date under the supervision of what I call orthodoxy; and for the lack of this supervision it is now the sentimental tenuity that we now find it. Most 'defenders of tradition' are mere conservatives, unable to distinguish between the permanent and the temporary, the essential and the accidental"—*After Strange Gods* (1933/4)

"In our time, when there are more social circles than there were circles in Dante's *Inferno*, when there are more philosophies, complete, incomplete, and inchoate, than there were builders at Babel, more theories, more tastes, when physical communication between nations is almost perfect, and intellectual communication almost extinct, it is more difficult, certainly, to find a common denominator; but it can be found; for as genius tends towards unity, so mediocrity tends toward uniformity. But it is obvious that in certain periods the revolution of the sphere of thought will so to speak throw off ideas which will fall within the attraction of poetry, and which the operation of poetry will transmute into the immediacy of feeling. It is these moments of history when human sensibility is momentarily *enlarged in certain directions* to be defined, that I propose to call the metaphysical periods." –The Clark Lectures (1926) (*Varieties* 52-53).

Arguably there are five trajectories of concern in the mature T. S. Eliot's thought and practice, and all of these speak in part to his evolving conception and practice of history:

- The mystical (which has a marked relationship to the vertical/eternal)
- The cultural (which exists within the horizon of the temporal/historical)
- The ecclesial (which exists within the historical but also is related to the eternal)
- The poetic [including the dramatic] (which develops out of these previous trajectories)
- The critical (which also develops out of these previous trajectories)



Of course, these five categories overlap and cross-pollinate; they are not airtight—the eternal speaks into all of them, and the mystical has its own history in Christian and non-Christian practice. The poetic and the critical often feed off of each other and strengthen each other. Likewise, Eliot's understanding of these changed as his relationship to religion and then to

Anglo-Catholic Christianity changed. In particular his understanding of nature and grace as representing two broad teleological ends for human beings: the first a more just natural order, even if in a fallen world that continues to undercut it, and the second the perfected state where we may behold God in beatitude. History is a natural and inevitably messy aspect of the temporal first, while it is preparatory for and longs for the second in part because the eternal keeps stepping down into it.

These five streams within Eliot's work with history can also be explored in at least ten categories of concern. I've tentatively called these "visions," though this is not the perfect word, and "questions" and "practices" also describe aspects of what Eliot is engaged in. These, too, overlap in a number of ways:

1. **A vision of the fragments of culture which need shoring up against the ruin of the modern world.**
   (*The Waste Land*; other early poetry, especially "Gerontion," "Lune de Miel," "Mr. Eliot's Sunday Morning Service," "A Cooking Egg,")

   > Unreal City,
   > Under the brown fog of a winter dawn,
   > A crowd flowed over London Bridge, so many,
   > I had not thought death had undone so many.
   > Sighs, short and infrequent, were exhaled,
   > And each man fixed his eyes before his feet.
   > Flowed up the hill and down King William Street,
   > To where Saint Mary Woolnoth kept the hours
   > With a dead sound on the final stroke of nine.
   > There I saw one I knew, and stopped him, crying: "Stetson!
   > "You who were with me in the ships at Mylae!
   > "That corpse you planted last year in your garden,
   > "Has it begun to sprout? Will it bloom this year?
   > "Or has the sudden frost disturbed its bed?
   > "Oh keep the Dog far hence, that's friend to men,
   > "Or with his nails he'll dig it up again!
   > "You! hypocrite lecteur!—mon semblable—mon frère!"
   > --*The Waste Land* I.

2. **A vision of the possibilities of tradition for poetry and criticism, which must be chosen and cultivated.**
   ("Tradition and the Individual Talent"; *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism*)

   > Tradition . . . cannot be inherited, and if you want it you must obtain it by great labour. . . .This historical sense, which is a sense of the timeless as well as of the temporal and of the timeless and of the temporal together, is what makes a writer traditional. And it is at the same time what makes a writer most acutely conscious of his place in time, of his own contemporaneity. No poet, no artist of any art, has his complete meaning alone. His significance, his appreciation is the appreciation of his relation to the dead poets and artists. You cannot value him alone; you must set him, for contrast and comparison, among the dead.
   > -- "Tradition and the Individual Talent"

3. **A vision of the classic which continues to invigorate culture and civilization.**
(“What is a Classic?”; “Modern Education and the Classics”; “Virgil and the Christian World”, “Dante”; “Goethe as the Sage”; “What Dante Means to Me”; “The Classics and the Man of Letters”; Chap. 6 in *Notes towards the Definition of Culture ; The Aims of Education*)

> If there is one word on which we can fix, which will suggest the maximum of what I mean by the term “a classic,” it is the word *maturity*. I shall distinguish between the universal classic, like Virgil, and the classic which is only such in relation to the other literature in its own language, or according to the view of life of a particular period. A classic can only occur when a civilization is mature; when a language and a literature are mature; and it must be the work of a mature mind. It is the importance of that civilization and of that language, as well as the comprehensiveness of the mind of the individual poet, which gives the universality. To define *maturity* without assuming that the hearer already knows what it means, is almost impossible: let us say then, that if we are properly mature, as well as educated persons, we can recognize maturity in a civilization and in a literature, as we do in the other human beings whom we encounter. To make the meaning of maturity really apprehensible – indeed, even to make it acceptable – to the immature, is perhaps impossible. But if we are mature we either recognize maturity immediately, or come to know it on more intimate acquaintance.
> --“What is a Classic?” (1945)

4. **A vision (or set of visions) as to how European (primarily English, French and Italian) poetry and prose represent changes in sensibility.**
(“The Metaphysical Poets”; “Milton” I and II; “From Poe to Valéry”; “Lancelot Andrewes”; *The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry* [The Clark and Turnbull Lectures]; *The Use of Poetry and the Use of Criticism*; “Baudelaire”; “Arnold and Pater”)

> . . . the product of men who felt and thought both clearly and beyond the ordinary frontiers of mind. These were men of highly trained intellects, who also had their feet very firmly on the ground – a rather muddy ground of politics, amours and gang fighting. In short, they represent a civilisation in some respects superior to our own, and superior to that of the world of Donne. Their syntax and choice of words affirm their superiority. You cannot live on a high plane and indulge yourself in verbiage.
> --The Clark Lectures (*Varieties* 96-97)

> The essential differences between Dante and Donne, and Dante and Crashaw, are, to sum up, these: that in Dante there is a system of thought to which is exactly equivalent a system of feeling, whilst with Donne there is only a kind of flow of thought to which is equivalent a flow of feeling; and that Dante alters or transforms his human feeling into divine feeling when applying it to divine objects, whilst Crashaw applies human feelings, though of intensity equal to any ever applied to human objects, almost unaltered to divine objects.
> --The Turnbull Lectures (*Varieties* 200)

5. **A vision of secularity and a questioning of Christianity’s continued place within or against the apostasy of the West.**
(*The Varieties of Metaphysical Poetry*; “Thoughts after Lambeth”; “Baudelaire”; “Arnold and Pater”; “The Humanism of Irving Babbitt”; “Second Thoughts on Humanism”; “Milton” I and II; “From Poe to Valéry”; *After Strange Gods*; *Idea of a Christian Society* (with elements in *The Cocktail Party*); *Notes towards the Definition of Culture*; *The Aims of Education*)

> What a discursive reading of the literature of secularism, over a number of years, leads me to believe, however, is that the religious sentiment – which can only be completely satisfied by the

complete message of revelation – is simply suffering from a condition of repression painful for those in whom it is repressed, who yearn for the fulfilment of belief, although too ashamed of that yearning to allow it to come to consciousness.
--Introduction to *Revelation*

The danger of what I have called the modern eschatology, the danger of neglecting the permanent for the transitory, the personal for the social, is one to which the poet is exposed in common with everyone else: but he has a peculiar responsibility not to be deluded. Yet I would ask you to have some sympathy with his difficulties. An age of change, and a period of incessant apprehension of war, do not form a favourable environment. There is a temptation to welcome change for its own sake, to sink our minds in some desperate philosophy of *action*; and several such philosophies are being urged upon us. Contempt for the past, and even ignorance of it, is on the increase, and many are ready for the unlimited experiment. We cannot effect intelligent change, unless we hold fast to the permanent essentials; and a clear understanding of what we should hold fast to, and what abandon, should make us all the better prepared to carry out the changes that are needed. Thus we can look back upon the past without regret, and to the future without fear.
--“Literature and the Modern World”

6. **A vision of redemptive history in the Church, which is always rebuilding until the final end comes.**
(*Ariel Poems*; *The Rock*) [*Murder in the Cathedral* shares concerns with this and with the vision of time and eternity]

And all that is ill you may repair if you walk together in humble repentance, expiating the sins of your fathers;
And all that was good you must fight to keep with hearts as devoted as those of your fathers who fought to gain it.
The Church must be forever building, for it is forever decaying within and attacked from without;
For this is the law of life; and you must remember that while there is time of prosperity
The people will neglect the Temple, and in time of adversity they will decry it
.-- Chorus II, *The Rock*.

7. **A vision of time and eternity in which the temporal world of movement, decay, and death is ever at odds with yet dependent upon the eternal.**
(*Burnt Norton*, though the theme develops in the other three Quartets)

Here is a place of disaffection
Time before and time after
In a dim light: neither daylight
Investing form with lucid stillness
Turning shadow into transient beauty
Wtih slow rotation suggesting permanence
Nor darkness to purify the soul
Emptying the sensual with deprivation
Cleansing affection from the temporal.
Neither plentitude nor vacancy. Only a flicker
Over the strained time-ridden faces
Distracted from distraction by distraction
Filled with fancies and empty of meaning
Tumid apathy with no concentration

Men and bits of paper, whirled by the cold wind
That blows before and after time,
Wind in and out of unwholesome lungs
Time before and time after.
Eructation of unhealthy souls
Into the faded air, the torpid
Driven on the wind that sweeps the gloomy hills of London,
Hampstead and Clerkenwell, Campden and Putney,
Highgate, Primrose and Ludgate. Not here
Not here the darkness, in this twittering world.
--*Burnt Norton* II

8. **A vision of family heritage which does not fulfill the promise of wisdom but is in need of redemption.**
(*East Coker*; also aspects in *The Family Reunion*, as well as *The Confidential Clerk* and *The Elder Statesman*; perhaps *Landscapes*)

So I had supposed. What of it?
What we have written is not a story of detection,
Of crime and punishment, but of sin and expiation.
It is possible that you have not known what sin
You shall expiate, or whose, or why. It is certain
That the knowledge of it must precede the expiation.
It is possible that sin may strain and struggle
In its dark instinctive birth, to come to consciousness
And so find expurgation. It is possible
You are the consciousness of your unhappy family,
Its bird sent flying through the purgatorial flame.
--Agatha to Harry in *The Family Reunion*

9. **A vision of evolutionary theodicy, which subject to destruction and death, looks to the mysticism of the saint to rise above it.**
(*The Dry Salvages;* perhaps the unpublished early "The Death of Saint Narcissus" as its partially antithesis; also compare with "To the Indians who Died in Africa")

It seems, as one becomes older,
That the past has another pattern, and ceases to be a mere sequence-
Or even development: the latter a partial fallacy
Encouraged by superficial notions of evolution,
Which becomes, in the popular mind, a means of disowning the past.
. . . .
Men's curiosity searches past and future
And clings to that dimension. But to apprehend
The point of intersection of the timeless
With time, is an occupation for the saint--
No occupation either, but something given
And taken, in a lifetime's death in love,
Ardour and selflessness and self-surrender.
For most of us, there is only the unattended
Moment, the moment in and out of time,
--*The Dry Salvages* II, V

10. **A vision of national history which looks to the symbolic arriving from eternity to offer kairotic significance.**
    (*Little Gidding;* compare with "Defence of the Islands" and "A Note on War Poetry")

    We die with the dying:
    See, they depart, and we go with them.
    We are born with the dead:
    See, they return, and bring us with them.
    The moment of the rose and the moment of the yew-tree
    Are of equal duration. A people without history
    Is not redeemed from time, for history is a pattern
    Of timeless moments. So, while the light fails.
    On a winter's afternoon, in a secluded chapel
    History is now and England.
    --*Little Gidding* V

The Trouble with History

It is also possible to speak of Eliot's career-long struggle with interpreting history, especially literary and cultural history. There are at least three aspects of Eliot's view of history that the above visions of hsitory do not entirely take in:

1. They don't entirely address the young Eliot's struggle with what to do philosophically with the inevitable flux of history, and what seemed to him at the time as its inevitable relativism that must be worked against.
2. Likewise, the models (especially #3 and #4) do not entirely address Eliot's awareness of the poet, historian, critic, or translator's perspectival limitations, or also advantages, in examining the past. After all, if our perspective can hinder us from understanding the past, it can also give us new questions that help us note things others have not noticed about the evidence we have from the past.
3. Eliot had a gift for generalization that involved historical judgments about past persons, and these have a readability that along makes them interesting, even if they can be argued with by other students of the period in question.

Early Relativism

Below is a long passage from an address by Eliot to the Moral Sciences Club at Cambridge in 1915. It is important because it shows that Eliot as a doctoral student, even though he labels himself a skeptical relativist, wants to make aesthetic, moral, even just factual judgments about the past, yet he realizes that any judgment we try to make may be reversed by further information or a new perspective. There are even "eternal principles" in some limited sense, but these are products of our mind's desire for order and coherence. And we need some kind of order by which to live a regular and sensible existence. The philosopher should understandably desire to bring order to the philosophical and literary past, though too often, Eliot thinks, this is done with a violence that doesn't respect the details and nuances of what past thinkers have felt and written. At this stage of his thought, Eliot is not convinced theology or metaphysics helps much, and the philosophical system of Hegel doesn't really succeed either in explaining the course of history, though it does help us to see how each time we change our mind about something we are also making a judgment about the history of our own thought (and therefore the systems of thought

we have absorbed). Eliot does think that historical change is a flux, and a flux seems to indicate relativism, yet strictly speaking, just as historians are striving to give an explanation of the past, even while recognizing that their conclusions may be reversed, so our attempts at values always face the possibility of being reorganized. This, he thinks, neither commits him to an absolute nor to a more complete relativism.

From "The Relativity of Moral Judgment" (1915)

Philosophy, as I apprehend it, is a hybrid compound of the three, science, [emotional] orgy, and conversation; though I fear that we are apt to overlook the third in the violence of our rushes from pole to pole. Every philosophy compounds them in its own proportions. Much of idealism, which is the philosophy of the historically minded, consists in an attempt to take the delicate and evasive truths of historical and literary criticism, truths which are the intuitive apprehension of a trained mind and a trained taste, and dragoon them into the goose-step of dialectic; while on the other hand, the more tough-minded philosopher sometimes presents the aspect of an elderly German mathematician learning to dance. But there are all sorts of ways of setting the world in order; from the relative precision of physics to the relative confusion of theology; and if, as I concede to idealism, each science manufactures its own objects, yet metaphysics is at liberty to manufacture its own objects too. As a relativist . . . I am not in a position even to desire to refute anybody; all that I have the desire and the right to attempt, is to indicate what seems to me the sensible, or *honnete* [Fr. Honest, sincere, decent] view. . . .

I do not mean that what are called descriptive and normative ethics can be completely divorced. The historical point of view does not exclude, but requires the concept of value; to describe morals without to some extent valuing is to describe a shadow. If we wish to make a skeleton hierarchy of value, we will take into consideration what the best individuals, and the best societies have valued, and this selection involves valuation. The skeleton itself will only give those predicates which have obtained a certain permanence, but its necessity is only relative, and (as in the case of the uniformity of nature) its permanence is only a postulate; nothing can guarantee us that tomorrow a new value may not upset our system from crown to foot. As a matter of fact, our systems are in course of change even from day to day. Yet the values at which we clutch are genuine, our morality is a serious matter; our ideals are operative– while they last.

I do not wish you to think that I advocate a philosophy of flux. To the best of my conviction, it is the business of philosophy to struggle against the flux, though the philosophy which overestimates its powers will always receive its due retribution. . . . . The most successful attempt that has ever been made, perhaps the only attempt, to organise history (including of course the history of value) into an intelligible process has been the philosophy of Hegel; its failure is even more instructive than its success; . . . It is obvious that the Hegelian form of relativism is not altogether without legitimate foundation. While everything is in course of change, yet it is not mere change unintelligible from the point of view of our interests and desires. Our desires are not mere desires, but lay some claim to permanence and cohesion. . . . . It does indeed appear as if every judgment demanded an intelligible and unified world, as if every valuation implied a world in which every part and aspect and moment should have its proper label of value. But what if this should be only an audacious claim, and if there should be some strange power capable of resistance to the omnivorousness of mind? And again, as Hegel well saw, a change of mind is not merely a change of mind, but is also to some degree a judgment upon the past, and every stage in our progress is self-consciousness of the preceding, an understanding of the judgment which at the time it was made, was an activity and therefore could not be conscious of itself. Hence, in the moral and emotional and intellectual development of a human being, the past is never discharged or disbanded; it is taken up and understood: and this understanding, this interpretation of it, we must assume to be what it meant confusedly at the time. . . . We strive above all things in life for coherence. . . .

It is natural and inevitable that we should go on to apply this law to social history as well as to the individual. The historian's business is not only to describe but to explain; to articulate the seemingly confused mass of data into an intelligible whole, so far as he can do this without forcing it into the narrow compass of perverse theory. We may develop this notion by saying that what mind really understands–the only thing that it really understands–the only thing, therefore, that is intelligible, the only thing therefore that is real, is mind. The historian therefore shows that mind takes the always new data, new situations, which are inexhaustibly presented to it (for I do not seriously accuse this philosophy of trying to anticipate history), and fashions a whole which is a new instance, a new embodiment, of eternal principles which only in these instances are actual. Consequently the mind, by reflecting on its own past values, brings forth for itself a set or system of values which supersedes, once and for all, preceding systems; though it will itself inevitably be superseded in its turn. Not that this system will be identical in all the finite minds of the same time; but their divergences will be so far as they are not mind; so far, that is, as they are nothing at all. Hence, from this point of view, it will not be literally true to say that values are absolute, or to say that they are relative.

The Historical Interactions of the Poet, Historian, Critic, and Translator

Here's a few examples of how Eliot could interact with the more practical questions of history for various kinds of writers:

> Our effort is as much to regain, under very different conditions, what was known to men writing at remote times and in alien languages. To do this it is not enough to bring up-to-date the *mise-en-scène*, to substitute the furniture of modern life for the furniture of a previous period, though it must be remembered that no sharp line can be drawn between the inner and the outer, and that this furniture is important in so far as the data of the senses always qualify and give particularity to our emotions: so that an experience in one place cannot be duplicated in another, and a dramatic scene in modern dress and modern speech differs in emotional quality from a similar scene set at another time and place. But emotions themselves are constantly being lost; they can never be merely preserved, but must be always rediscovered; and it is as much this endless battle to regain civilisation, in the midst of continuous outer and inner change of history, as the struggle to conquer the absolutely new, that is the occupation of the poet. Just as history has constantly to be re-written, because everything is gradually altered by the lengthening perspective; so also the poet needs an alert consciousness of the past, in order to realise in its particular concreteness the moment at which he lives.
> --"That Poetry Is Made with Words," Review (27 April 1939) of *Situation de la poésie* by Jacques and Raissa Maritain

> Perhaps the final problem for historical students is a problem of imagination – that is, to reconstruct for ourselves so fully the mind of the Renaissance and the mind of the pre-Renaissance, that neither of them shall be dead for us – that is to say, unconscious parts of our own mind – but shall be conscious and therefore utilizable for our future development.
> --"Hooker, Hobbes, and Others" 1926 Review of *The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*

> Whatever other pleasures were available, the sermon continued to draw. It was, of course, by no means a pure zeal for righteousness or a speculative curiosity in the finer points of theology that attracted the public, and there is no reason for supposing the average man or woman of the seventeenth century to have been more religiously minded than the man or woman of any other epoch. Indeed, apart from remarkable individuals and particular waves of excitement, one period of history differs less from another, in degree of religious feeling, than we sometimes suppose. But the seventeenth century was not merely an age of religious controversy and warfare, it was an

age in which religious (or sectarian) passions and political passions were inextricably involved. Religious affairs affected everybody, though not necessarily in a religious way. And the spoken sermon had for many an interest later assumed by the political speech.
-- 1928 Review of *English Preachers and Preaching: 1640-1670*

We find it difficult, of course, to believe that the view of Shakespeare to be taken 100 years hence can be very different from our own. On the other hand, we are inclined to assume that the criticism of Shakespeare written before the nineteenth century is less illuminating than that written since. Neither assumption is quite true. There is undeniably an aspect in which early criticism may be seen as the substructure of that of the nineteenth century. We have to admit that the fuller understanding of Shakespeare's greatness came slowly, just as it comes slowly, I believe, in the life of the individual reader. But Shakespeare criticism cannot be appreciated without some understanding of the time and of the place in which it is written, without allowing for its nearness or remoteness in place or time from the object, and for its inevitable development in the future. The views of Shakespeare taken by different men at different times in different places form an integral part of the development and change of European civilisation during the last 300 years.
--"Shakespearean Criticism I" (1934)

Historical Generalizations

Eliot's use of historical generalization is ubiquitous throughout his writings as a critic, and good examples can be found in every period of his career. If this technique models what he had to say early on about the historian and critic's need to bring order to their judgments, it also connects to his eventual argument that wisdom is found in connecting the eternal with the temporal and that examples for our study are a profound part of this.

As the authors of this book are perfectly aware, Goethe, the object of passionate adoration to mid-Victorians, is at present in eclipse. . . . That is not altogether our fault; the decline of interest in Goethe was an inevitable moment of history; and is connected with the reasons for which he is a writer of permanent greatness. Goethe is, as Mr. Santayana made clear in an essay which is the nearest approach to a new critical opinion that I know, a philosophical poet. His philosophy, unfortunately, is that which the nineteenth century took up with, and it has therefore become too familiar to us in popular or degraded forms. Love, Nature, God, Man, Science, Progress: the post-Goethe versions of these terms are still current. But they are gradually being replaced; and as they are replaced, we shall be able to see Goethe more clearly and with more admiration.

It might be excessive to say that we cannot understand the nineteenth century without knowing Goethe; but it may be true to say that we cannot understand that century until we are able to understand Goethe. And perhaps the best way to understand many of the ideas of the nineteenth century is to go back behind them, to the man who expressed them best, and in whom they were fresh and new and enthusiastic.
--12 January 1929 Review of *Introduction to Goethe*

While insisting on the peculiar qualities of the prose of Donne, which make it unique in its own and any time, one ought to show him also in his place as one among the great divines of the English Church of that period, of whom Hooker is another, and Andrewes is another, and remark upon the extent to which not the Church only, but the whole of English civilisation, is indebted to those men. Without Hooker, the prose of the philosopher, the jurist, even of the scientist, would not have developed so rapidly; without Donne, the more ornate types of English prose, of Sir

Thomas Browne and Jeremy Taylor, would not have developed so rapidly. And compare the prose of Donne with that of Thomas Nashe. Donne is of a more mature intellectual generation: not merely a greater writer, but more adult. There are "poetic" passages in the prose of Nashe and his group: but with Donne the sensibility of the poet and dramatist is infused into a prose which is that of the man of thought.
--"The Prose of the Preacher: The Sermons of John Donne" (1929 Broadcast Talk)

Machiavelli has been the torment of Jesuits and Calvinists, the idol of Napoleons and Nietzsches, a stock figure for Elizabethan drama, and the exemplar of a Mussolini or a Lenin. Machiavelli has been called a cynic; but there could be no stronger inspiration to "cynicism" than the history of Machiavelli's reputation. No history could illustrate better than that of the reputation of Machiavelli the triviality and the irrelevance of influence. His message has been falsified by persistent romanticism ever since. To the humbug of every century Machiavelli is essential. And yet no great man has been so completely misunderstood. He is always placed a little askew. He does not belong with Aristotle, or with Dante, in political theory; he attempted something different. He does not belong with Napoleon, and still less with Nietzsche. His statements lend themselves to any modern theory of the State, but they belong with none.
--"Nicolo Machiavelli (1469-1527)" [1927]